Declassified Document Describes CIA Errors in Iraq
Thomas Blanton directs the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
Before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US intelligence community claimed that Saddam Hussein was hiding stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.
Those intelligence analysts warned that Hussein would probably have a nuclear weapon within a decade.
That intelligence justified the invasion of Iraq.
But it proved faulty.
In a newly declassified document, the CIA offers its rationale for why it got things so wrong.
Thomas Blanton worked to get the document released.
He directs the National Security Archive at George Washington University.
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