Unelected forces controlling Ukraine trying to do what they could not under Yanukovych

DALLAS, Pennsylvania—With their stance toward the revolution that toppled former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, the Obama administration and its European allies have now placed the stability of Ukraine in serious doubt, and risk a Cold War on a global scale.

The protests against Yanukovych’s corrupt regime were impressive, and the loss of life in the fight to remove him should not be forgotten.

Yet, the idea that the protests were allowed to proceed as a geo-economic and a democratic question was problematic from the beginning. The protestors believe Ukraine is not a democratic country but, nevertheless, belongs in the European Union (EU).

The democratic aspect of the protests is only half true, since the 2012 parliamentary elections were reasonably fair.

The political forces that now control Ukraine did not win those recent elections.

They are now trying to do what they could not do prior to the overthrow of Yanukovych. It is an open question whether immediate parliamentary elections would enable them to push the country unequivocally toward the EU.

EU membership has significant support, but the issue of membership is still a contested issue. Rather than focusing on the corruption of Yanukovych, the Obama administration and EU officials assumed the democratic question, the corruption of Yanukovych, and the EU question were intrinsically linked.

In the short run, it has led to reckless political behavior in Ukraine.
There is no indication the leadership that assumed power in Ukraine was warned to form a government of national unity.

Its chief leaders are clearly pro-western, but none has any significant national standing. Key actors, such as Arseniy Yatsenyuk, the new prime minister, have been described repeatedly as technocrats, apolitical or above the politics of national security.

That description could not be further from the truth.

More than anytime since the 1994 elections, hard-line Ukrainian nationalists have received a number of posts disproportionate to their support within the electorate.

Serious concerns exist that the more populous eastern and southern regions of Ukraine have effectively been disenfranchised, coupled with the attempt to downgrade the Russian language’s official status.

Parliament raised this issue before Russia’s invasion. Interim President Oleksandr Turchynov vetoed it only after the invasion.

The charge of mob rule becomes legitimate if everything is decided in Kyiv’s Independence Square, where the country is trying to garner support for a new government from the protestors in the street.

Does anyone really know the motivations of the thousands that protested? They may reflect the majority of Ukrainians, but how does the rest of the world know this?

There has been very little reporting from inside the historically troubled country to reveal the Ukrainians’ objectives.

We do know people in the streets represented anti-Russian and anti-Soviet passions and favored policy preferences that are rejected by most Ukrainians. Unless we want to define democracy in terms of the end justifies the means, the events in Ukraine lend themselves to charges of a coup.

The United States government has made no statement on the need for immediate elections nor has it chastised the government for its lack of a true national identity because it supports a western orientation.

Elections will not come until the end of May, presumably after Ukraine has made significant steps toward ensuring its western orientation.
Ukrainian authorities also failed to heed a lesson from the Orange Revolution in 2004.

Immediate contact with Russia was deemed necessary to resolve this crisis. Yulia Tymoshenko and others traveled to Moscow to assure Russia that it needed to support the election of Viktor Yushchenko.

What Tymoshenko promised is a matter of controversy, but her trip represents a long tradition in the post-independence politics of Ukraine.

Assuaging Russia’s interests is not appeasement; it is just wise policy that was supported by many Ukrainians.

The competence of the new leadership is further questioned by the appointment of oligarchs to positions in the east. Not only does this threaten the pro-western coalition in Kyiv, it also potentially offends voters in the east.

Were there no other prominent officials from the east who could have reassured both voters and Russia?

The Sochi Olympics complicated diplomacy, but did not preclude a diplomatic trip to Moscow. There also is no public evidence of the US attempting to engage Russia in the way Ukrainian officials have routinely done since independence.

Instead, the new Ukrainian government has been unequivocally supported by the US and most European allies, while Russia has been warned to respect the new government and the territorial integrity of Ukraine as political brinkmanship has ensued.

We can reject Russian military intervention, but treating Russia as if it is just an ordinary power prior to this act flew in the face of history.

Reassuring Russia and Russian-speakers may not have worked this time, even though it did at other points of crisis between the two countries. Now the Crimea may be lost, and Washington probably has no hope of Russian cooperation on more important US national security concerns.

Christopher Stevens is an assistant professor of history and government in the Government, Law and National Security Program at Misericordia University. He is an authority in US national security, international relations, conflict management and the former Soviet Union.