The last time I visited Afghanistan, four years ago, Kabul was a town where you had to be streetwise and careful not to wander around alone in certain neighborhoods, but it was hardly more dangerous than some of America's rougher inner cities. Today, foreign visitors find the Afghan capital more problematic and an increasingly difficult place to work. A Western aid worker was recently shot dead by terrorists while walking to her office. The Taliban have cut off three of the four major routes linking Kabul to the rest of the country. The city is edgy, expecting the worst.

What has gone wrong since President Bush toppled the Taliban?

The popular view is that the Bush administration launched another – unnecessary – war in Iraq that drained resources from the campaign in Afghanistan. That's partly true. But the basic problem is that the United States never put enough men and money into the campaign in the first place. President Bush tried to pacify, stabilize, and rebuild Afghanistan on the cheap. The Russians could not do it in the 1980s with three times as many men. The British could not do it at the height of their imperial power in the 19th century. President Bush ignored the obvious lessons of history and never made the required effort, which would have strained America's military resources even without a second war.

And that brings us to the present situation in that barren and unmanageable country. Fly over Afghanistan and you will see that it is mostly desert wilderness and bare mountains with isolated communities that lack the communications and cohesion to make a unified state. Try to travel over it by land and you will find that even the new highways that are being built with Western aid are usually too dangerous to drive on without extreme precautions. The much vaunted schools that have been built with Western aid often lack basic supplies, and in the more dangerous areas of the country, lack students as well because of threats and attacks from the Taliban. Even the supply lines for U.S. troops in Afghanistan are now under attack by insurgents based in the Pakistan border areas. Last week, militants linked to Al Qaeda hijacked a convoy and stole Humvees and other American military vehicles. This has been the worst year for Taliban attacks and American casualties since the war began.

Most Afghans see President Hamid Karzai as a weak and incompetent puppet of the Americans and his administration as corrupt. Afghanistan in reality is, and has always been, a patchwork of independent tribal fiefdoms that are not controlled by the central government. Bribery is a way of life. You can buy an Afghan tribal leader - but only until someone else comes along with a better offer.

That's what General David Petraeus, the new head of the U.S. Central Command, is thinking of doing. He would like to do deals with the more “reconcilable” elements of the Taliban, and recruit them to work on the government's side, just as he did with Sunni insurgents in Iraq. That has worked in Iraq (at least for the moment) but may not work in Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership insists it will not talk to President Karzai until foreign troops leave the country.

The military effort to stop the insurgency clearly has not worked. When the American-led coalition attacked Afghanistan, it never really defeated the Taliban on the ground. They simply slipped back into their villages when U.S. warplanes pounded them from the air while northern Afghan tribesmen pushed south into the capital. In the years that followed, the Taliban have adopted the classic guerrilla tactics that made the Russians give up and go home. Without enough troops to defeat the Taliban on the ground, the United States again turned to air power as a cheaper solution, but that has backfired. The civilian casualties caused by these air strikes have turned clans and tribes against the Americans and helped the Taliban recruit more insurgents.

So where does America go from here? For one thing, it's Mr. Obama's war now – or will be on January 20th. He has promised to put more troops into Afghanistan, but that alone will not “win” the war. Many observers believe a decisive military victory is not possible with the limited manpower the Pentagon now has at its disposal. America's coalition allies may be more willing to help Mr. Obama than they were President Bush, but they are unable to commit enough troops to make a difference.
That leaves a negotiated settlement as the only alternative: talking with those Taliban who are willing to listen, bribing and co-opting as many tribesmen as possible, and enlisting the cooperation of Iran and Pakistan. Iran is no friend of the Taliban and may be ready to help the United States find a way out of its predicament as part of a larger settlement of other issues including Iran's nuclear program. Pakistan may be a tougher problem because it has become a sanctuary for both the Taliban and al Qaeda (apparently including Osama bin Laden).

In the end, the Obama administration may have to abandon the ambitious Bush goal of turning Afghanistan into a Western-style democracy. That was always unrealistic, given the archaic nature of Afghan society. The United States may have to settle for something like a loose federation ruled by a strongman elected by an assembly of local warlords. That's not the most desirable solution, but if such a government can control the Taliban, it's not the worst solution - which would be a lawless Afghanistan that harbors al Qaeda and threatens America's interests.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who may be asked to stay on in the next administration, seems to favor negotiation and reconciliation with America's enemies in Afghanistan. “At the end of the day, that's how most wars end,” he says. “That's ultimately the exit strategy for all of us.”