Russia's brash invasion of Georgia in response to Georgia's foolish attack on the breakaway region of South Ossetia was a moment of truth. It is now blindingly obvious that America's post-Cold War “new world order” was an illusion. The old fears and rivalries are still there. The brief war in the Caucasus put the fox in the henhouse, and the chickens are scrambling for safety – some into the arms of the West, others into a closer embrace with Moscow.

Poland was one of the first to run to Washington. After months of haggling over whether to accept an American missile defense system on its territory, it signed up at once. The Polish people, who feared the American missile base would unduly provoke their former Russian masters, quickly dropped their objections.

The clobbering that Russia gave Georgia caused other former Soviet satellites to cozy up to the United States. The presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia urged NATO to strengthen security guarantees for Russia's neighbors.

Georgia of course thought America would come to its rescue, and when it got only empty words from Washington, that sent a chill through Ukraine, another candidate for NATO membership. It fears it could be next on Russia's list, and Ukrainian politicians are now arguing over whether to look East or West for their security.

Other former Soviet states, such as Belarus and Armenia, which have retained close links to Moscow, will now be encouraged to strengthen those ties. Russia might even try to put its own missiles in Belarus to counter the proposed American bases in Poland and the Czech Republic.

Russia's show of force in Georgia has also strengthened its control over the energy resources on its periphery. Both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which have been trying to find ways to export their oil and gas without going through Russian controlled territory, may have to give up and use Russian pipelines now that Moscow seems to hold all the cards in the region.

As the dust settles from the war, other changes to the geopolitical landscape are becoming apparent. The United States has been banking on the cooperation of key countries to increase sanctions on the Iranians if they do not stop uranium enrichment. Now it is doubtful whether the Russians will participate in new sanctions, and without them sanctions mean little. The Iranians might even be tempted to take advantage of the chill in Russian-American relations by trying to talk the Russians into selling them advanced weapons, such as an air defense system.

Syria has already tried that ploy and apparently failed. President Bashar al Assad went to Moscow last week to shop for arms, but the Russians refused to sell them ballistic missiles that could upset the strategic balance of power in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, all this is happening during an American presidential campaign when the candidates may be more interested in scoring points against each other rather than seeking a rational approach to a complex and dangerous international crisis.

What position should the candidates take? Other than saying nothing – which might be less harmful than bombastic threats against Russia or empty pledges of support for Georgia – the best stand might be along the lines suggested by Gareth Evans, president of the International Crisis Group, a respected organization dedicated to crisis resolution: “The West needs to address Russia's behavior not by isolating Moscow, but by engaging it in a way that is both hard-headed and conditional,” said Evans. He suggests that the West tell Russia it could be dropped from the G-8 club of leading industrial nations and its application to join the World Trade Organization could be blocked if it does not respect the cease-fire agreement and cooperate in implementing the international peacekeeping mission. On the other hand if Russia improves its behavior, “the West is prepared to explore common security interests and ways to bridge differences” on a wide range of security and economic issues.

If that doesn't work, Russia's own self interest might mitigate its behavior. Since the war broke out, foreign investors have been pulling money out of Russia at the fastest rate since the 1998 rouble crisis. Russian stock and bond markets have taken a nosedive. If the industrialists that run the Russian economy – the so-called “oligarchs” – get hammered, they might convince President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin that good behavior has its own rewards and vice versa.