Years ago, when the British economist John Maynard Keynes was criticized for changing his views (on government intervention in markets), he replied “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?” I recalled that famous quote recently when facts in the Middle East indicated that Israel and Syria are seriously trying to make peace after 60 years of hostility.

If true, this would contradict the view long held by many observers of the Middle East (myself included) that no peace is possible between Israel and its neighbors without the active involvement of the United States. As far as I can see, Israel and Syria are doing this more or less on their own, and in fact against the wishes of the Bush administration.

First, the facts:

1. Turkey, which is trying to carve out a bigger role for itself in the Middle East, has been brokering indirect peace talks between Syria and Israel. Both sides have confirmed that much.
2. A Turkish official quoted in the Israeli press last week said it is now time for direct talks. He said the negotiations would cover the return of the Golan Heights (which Israel took from Syria in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), creation of a buffer zone, mutual security arrangements and normalization of relations.
3. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has been making a number of behind the scenes moves to pave the way for a final agreement. They include a shake-up of the Syrian military and intelligence establishments and strengthening of Syria's relations with its client state, Lebanon.

Why is this happening now, when Washington is preoccupied with other matters and shows little enthusiasm for improving relations with Assad?

1. As far as I can see, both sides are acting out of their own national interests rather than waiting for a push from Washington. Israel wants to secure its northern borders, and would insist as part of the deal that Syria cut off its support for Lebanon's Hezbollah militia, which fought Israel to a standstill two years ago.
2. Syria would re-establish control over Lebanon (its traditional source of wealth). Assad would also strengthen his domestic support by winning back the Golan Heights.
3. Hezbollah, whose only other real friend is Iran, would be the big loser – and that would please just about everybody else, including all the Arab neighbors. As far as Assad is concerned, Hezbollah is simply a negotiating card, to be discarded when no longer needed.

What would such an agreement mean for the Middle East?

1. For the first time in its history, Israel would be at peace with all of its immediate Arab neighbors. That's a seismic change.
2. Iran would lose two of its friends and sources of influence in the Middle East, Hezbollah and Syria.
3. The Palestinians would still be out in the cold, unless they can somehow get their act together.

So if such an agreement is in the works, why was Assad acting so hard to get at this week's big Mediterranean summit in Paris and telling reporters he is in no hurry for a deal? He not only refused to shake the hand of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. He barely acknowledged his presence. That, too, could be a sign that a deal is imminent. If you have ever bought a rug in a Middle East bazaar, you know that the usual tactic is to walk away from a deal until the merchant comes running after you with a final offer. Israeli diplomatic sources, by the way, say Olmert has delivered a message to Assad via the Turks saying it would be a mistake to wait for a new American president before engaging in direct talks.

One other thing:
After 40 years of experience in and out of the Middle East, I am also aware that I may be wildly wrong about all this. I learned long ago to be wary of trying to predict the future in that part of the world. History teaches us that whenever a peace deal seems near in the Middle East, someone will try to blow it to smithereens.