We all know that political campaigns do not produce much intelligent debate of important issues, and that few candidates dare tell the public too many hard truths for fear of spoiling their chances of election. But even by the dismally low standards of American politics, both Senator Obama and Senator McCain have failed to give the public a real choice of policies on the conflict in Afghanistan.
There has been no real debate because both candidates seem to share the common view that Afghanistan is a “good†war that the Bush administration and its NATO allies have failed to support fully, and that with more money and manpower, it is winnable.
This simplistic view is – to put it bluntly – a fairy tale. It is a delusion rather than a sound basis on which to build future policy.
First of all, the United States has no agreed definition of what “winning†the Afghan War really means – primarily because America's goals are so confused. The U.S. did not go to war in Afghanistan so that Afghan girls would be allowed to go to school - however laudable that aim may be. Nation building, the raising of living standards in one of the world's poorest nations, and even the creation of a democracy in a land wracked by civil war, were not the real reasons American went to war after 9/11. The goal was to smash Al Qaeda and crush the Taliban who supported it.
By any standard, the continuing conflict in Afghanistan is far from resolved and in the long run may not be winnable at a cost Americans are willing to pay. Top American and allied military commanders in Iraq believe it would take at least 15 years to create a stable country and rid it of the Taliban. Neither the American public nor the increasingly reluctant Canadians and Europeans show any signs of the strong resolve that would be needed to support a military campaign that could last for a generation.
The Afghans and their neighbors are no fools. They assume the Americans and their allies will eventually fold their tents and go home. Like the Russians did before them, and the British in the nineteenth century. If the Soviet Union could not pacify Afghanistan with 300,000 troops, and the British could not do it at the height of their imperial power, it is not unreasonable to think that a mere 70,000 U.S. and other international troops will fail as well, and that the Taliban will be back some day. In fact, they are already showing signs of staging a comeback in the south and east of the country.
So the Afghans are paying, at best, lip service to the fragile government that the United States maintains and supports in Kabul, and are keeping their options open with the Taliban. President Hamid Karzai is a likeable, decent sort of person, but not the man you would want to bet the farm on in the dog-eat-dog world of Afghanistan.
Karzai openly accuses his neighbors the Pakistanis – especially their Interservices Intelligence organization - of training and supporting the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters who are trying to undermine his government. The Pakistanis are looking after their own interests, and want a friendly force in Afghanistan after the Americans go home.
What does all this mean for future American policy in that corner of the world? Well, to start with, it means taking a clearer look at the real situation in Afghanistan. Even now, seven years after the United States backed a collection of Afghan tribes and warlords with American air power to help them drive out the Taliban, Afghanistan is a failed state.
1. President Karzai has little power beyond the capital.
2. It is a “narco-state,†producing 90 per cent of the world's opium.
3. It is extraordinarily corrupt. By some estimates, a third of the Western aid money poured into the country has been lost to corruption.
4. It is far from being pacified. Parts of the famous ring road that Western aid is building to link all sides of the country are too dangerous for all but the bravest to use because the Taliban and other brigands set up road blocks to rob, kidnap and even behead motorists.
5. America's allies cannot, or will not, provide a substantial increase in troops, so the war in the south and east, where the Taliban are staging a comeback, is becoming an increasingly American effort.
Which candidate is going to tell the American voters all these unpalatable truths? Neither, I suspect. Yet without a clear view of the present conditions, America cannot build a realistic policy on Afghanistan.
Any workable plan would have to involve negotiations with the Taliban. After all, the United States was quietly talking with the Taliban in the Clinton years, when American oil companies were looking for a way to export the oil and gas riches of Central Asia without running pipelines through Russia. It was thought at the time that the Taliban could form an Afghan government that would be friendly to the U.S. and allow the pipelines to transit their country. The State Department was not so choosy then about whom it dealt with or what their democratic credentials were.
The plan would also have to involve Afghanistan's immediate neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, whose cooperation would be essential in helping stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. Nation building is not a job the United States should undertake alone.
Finally, Washington should recognize that long term occupation of a foreign country – especially a Muslim country with no tradition of American-style democracy – will not be popular with the natives and will eventually fail. There is a limit to how long the Afghanis and the American public will tolerate the occupation.
The bottom line is that the United States should do the best it can to stabilize Afghanistan, even if that means leaving it with a benign dictatorship, and get out as soon as it decently can.