One of the best ways to see a big problem clearly is to stand back and take the long view. Take a good hard look at Afghanistan, where much of what we see in the news these days is the wreckage from roadside bombs and brief reports of skirmishes in obscure villages. It is hard to discern a pattern, to make out who is winning and who is losing. But seen from the perspective of history, the eventual outcome of the American coalition war against the resurgent Taliban seems much clearer.

Afghanistan was a graveyard for British imperial forces in the 19th century. It was a graveyard of the Soviet army in the 20th century. And history tells us the Afghans are likely to bury the latest foreign attempts to pacify their rugged and inhospitable country.

U.S. troops in Afghanistan

The generals who command close to 50,000 American and NATO forces in Afghanistan have been saying privately for more than a year now that western forces will have to remain in the country as long as fifteen years to defeat the insurgency and stabilize the weak central government. They have already been there for five years. It is unlikely that the overstretched American and British forces, the Canadians who have been taking relatively heavy casualties, the under-funded French, the reluctant Italians, the timid Germans and the rest of the multinational coalition have the will to stay the course for many more years.

The history of the American coalition campaign in Afghanistan has yet to be written, but if you are looking for a detailed and objective study of what is now being called the “neo-Taliban insurgency,” I would recommend Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, by Antonio Giustozzi of the London School of Economics. Giustozzi, who has spent more than a decade visiting, researching and writing on Afghanistan, told me that he believes the Taliban are tactically weak and technologically illiterate, but have a “fair chance” of winning because they will force the foreigners to leave. The Taliban strategy is to make the occupation as difficult as possible, and wait for the foreigners to go home.

Taliban fighters

Seen from his perspective, much of what has been written and said in the West about the pacification of Afghanistan sounds like wishful thinking. Ever since the allied invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there has been endless talk about rebuilding Afghanistan and winning the support of the population, despite the fact that much of the country is still outside government control. There have been endless pronouncements from Washington of an impending victory over the Taliban. It was not until late 2006 that the Western media began to report that the Taliban were again a significant threat, although Giustozzi notes that the neo-Taliban insurgency had “put down strong roots in Afghanistan as early as 2003.”

He points to a series of contradictions and weaknesses in the coalition campaign in Afghanistan. Among the most important:

1. The coalition is trying to win hearts and minds while at the same time alienating the population with heavy-handed fighting tactics.

2. Its efforts to run a counter-insurgency program based on distributing patronage to warlords conflicts with its goal of good governance.

3. The Bush administration has shown little interest in Afghanistan and has left control of the military campaign to the fast-rotating commanders of the coalition forces.

4. The Taliban have been pursuing a consistent strategy while “neither the United States nor the Afghan government ever had a consistent strategy lasting more than one year.”

How does Giustozzi believe the war in Afghanistan will end? He concedes that the United States might make some sort of a peace settlement with the Taliban, but it would be a face-saving deal of the kind that allowed the Soviets to depart without admitting total defeat. And, he warns, it would not last.

Visitors to Afghanistan already report a growing feeling among the population (even in Kabul, the capital) that the Taliban will eventually take over the country again.

That, in short, is the big picture. It is not a pretty picture, if you consider the medieval mindset of the Taliban and their human rights record, but it may be the most realistic.